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1943]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

to appoint a military commission to try enemy belligerents for offenses
against the law of war and Articles of War is evident unless prevented
by provisions of the Constitution relating to trial by jury. U.S. Const.
Art. I, §8, cis. 1, 10-14, 18; Art. II, §1, cl. 1, §3; 41 Stat. 787-812
(1920), 10 U.S.C. §§1471-1593 (1940).
The law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces
and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations, and between
lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are those who,
wearing the insignia of their country, wage war in the open. Annex to Hague Convention, ratified by the U.S. Senate, 36 Stat. 2295
(1909); 2 Oppenheim, International Law (6th ed. 1940) §107. Unlawful combatants are those who, without uniform, secretly pass
through the lines of the enemy for the purpose of destruction of
life and property, and gathering military information.
Unlawful
combatants are generally held not to be entitled to the status of
prisoners of war, but are triable by a military comanission. 41 Stat.
789 (1920), 10 U.S.C. §1483 (Articles of War, 1940); Great Britain
War Office, Manual of Military Law (1929) §445; 2 Oppenheim,
International Law (6th ed. 1940) §255.
Petitioners, under the undisputed facts, clearly come within the definition of unlawful combatants, and are to be treated and dealt with as such.
Our Constitution and statutes are very liberal in guaranteeing
trial by jury to persons charged with offenses, and the petitioners
sought to take advantage of this fact. Their rights in this respect
are to be determined by the construction to be given certain constitutional provisions, particularly Art. III, §2, and the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. It was not the purpose or effect of Art. III, § 2 to enlarge the then existing right to trial by jury. The object was to preserve unimpaired trial by jury in all those cases in which it had
been recognized by the common law and in all cases of a like nature
as they might arise in the future. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282
U.S. 63 (1930); Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1 (1921).
The Fifth
and Sixth Amendments guaranteed the continuance of certain instances
of trial by jury, but did not enlarge the right guaranteed by Art. In,
§2. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
At the time of the adoption of these provisions, military tribunals were recognized and persons
charged with violation of the law of war were tried thereby and without a jury. The trial of Major John Andr6 by a military commission
appointed by General Washington is an example. Van Doren, Secret
History of the American Revolution (1st ed. 1941) 355-358; Sargent,
Life and Career of Major Andr6 (1st ed. 1861) 347-356.
In the instant case the petitioners were not entitled to a trial by
jury; they were, therefore, properly tried before a mlitary commission.

CONTRACTS
AGREEMENTS TO REPURCHASE
The plaintiffs purchased at par value six shares of preferred
stock in a lumber company. Contemporaneous with the purchase, an
agreement was signed in which defendants agreed to repurchase the
stock at par value plus any earned and unpaid dividends, "at any
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time" after six months' notice. Five years later plaintiffs attempted
to exercise their option, but defendants refused to repurchase the stock.
Held, for the defendant. Haworth v. Hubbard, - Ind. - 44 N.E. 967
(1942).
The words of a contract should be given their' common ordinary
meaning unless it is repugnant to the intent of the parties. New York
Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transport Corporation, 34 F. (2d) 655, 656
(C.C.A. 2nd, 1929). Generally, courts hold against the theory that a contract confers a perpetuity of right or imposes a perpetuity of obligations.
Holt v. St. Louis Union Tr. Co., 52 F. (2d) 1068 (C.C.A. 4th, 1931);
Hess v. Iowa Heat & Powers Co., 207 Iowa 820, 221 N. W. 194 (1928).
In a contract for the return- of shirts, Iye v. Brody, 156 Ill. App.
479 (1910); a friendly offer to purchase stock, Park v. Whitney, 148
Mass. 278, 19 N. E. 161 (1889); a right to remove property, Perry
v. Acme Oil Company, 44 Ind. App. 207, 88 N. E. 859 (1909); a lease
for cutting timber, Fletcher v. Lyon, 93 Ark. 5, 123 S.W. 801 (1909);
a right to certain oil casings and rods, Terry v. Crosswy, Tex. Civ. App.,
264 S.W. 718 (1924); insurance contracts for reporting losses, Pickels
v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 119 Ind. 291, 21 N.E. 898 (1889); oral agreement
to repurchase stock, Armstrong v. Orler, 220 Mass. 112, 107 N.E. 392
(1915); the courts have held the words "at any time" to mean "any
reasonable time."
In the principal case the defendant was in a private enterprise
subject to all the dangers of competition; the business was constantly
threatened with radical changes in management; the plaintiffs were
located in the same community as the corporation and able to watch
its trends closely. It seems improbable that the parties had in mind
entering into an unending obligation. "Any other theory than this
would subject incautious persons-a class, it may be remarked, which
includes the majority of mankind-into life long servitudes, and greatly
fetter and embarrass the commerce of the world." Dover Copper Mining
Company v. Doenzes, 40 Ariz. 349, 12 P. (2d) 288, 292 (1932).

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
JURISDICTION OF STATE EQUITY COURTS
Complainant was discharged for alleged violation of a labor contract between defendant company and defendant union. He seeks reinstatement and an injunction against the enforcement of the contract
in a state court of equity. Held, action dismissed. A state court of
equity has no jurisdiction over disputes cognizable under the National
Labor Relations Act. Keller v. American Cyanide Co., -N.J. Eq.-,
28 Atl. 41, (1942).
The procedure prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act,
49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§151-166 (1941) is exclusive. National Labor Relations Board v. Link Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584 (1940);
National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U.S. 350
(1940); National Labor Relations Board v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453
(1939). These decisions are based on §10(a) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §160 (1941) which declares that the power
of the Board "shall be exclusive, and shall not be affected by any

